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REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS. Edited by
Thomas K McCraw. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
1981. Pp. ix, 246. $17.95.
Regulation in Perspective: Historical Essays presents a collection of five
essays, originally presented at a Harvard Business School Conference. The
contributors focus on the history of regulation, generally avoiding economic
analysis. Instead, the authors - four historians and a political scientist describe American regulatory schemes as a function of the society in which
they arose. This results in some interesting commentary from some relatively uncommon analytic perspectives.
Each author begins by closely examining a particular phase of economic
regulation. The subjects range from the regulations of various industries
prior to the New Deal to the independent role of regulatory agencies in the
structure of American government. Historical episodes are compared and
contrasted throughout, with the aim of understanding the past and predicting, as well as guiding, the future. The central theme uniting the contributions is a common concern for the felt need which inspired different
regulatory enterprises. While those needs varied greatly across time and
across industries, the contributors agree with Morton Keller's assertion in
the second essay that a nation's regulatory system reflects its history and the
development of its society. As Gerald Berk notes in his concluding essay,
the history of regulation "is, in large part, a history of how people thought
about and debated the nature of the market, economic efficiency, business
social responsibility, and acceptable levels of health and environmental risk
in industrial society" (p. 187).
The authors, of course, go beyond the somewhat unsurprising conclusion that public ideology has shaped the regulatory environment. One of
the most interesting aspects of the book is the contributors' analyses of the
role of economic as opposed to other influences in the formation of the
public attitudes governing the scope of regulation. For example, Thomas
Mccraw challenges the primacy of economic efficiency in the original understanding of antitrust legislation. At least some early reformers, notably
Brandeis, supported trade regulation because of political and social, rather
than economic, considerations. McCraw translates the antitrust debate of
the early twentieth century into the contemporary vocabulary of industrial
concentration economics, 1 and concludes that Brandeis rested his support
for regulation on other grounds. For ideological reasons derived from the
progressive movement, Brandeis perceived the antitrust issue as an opportunity to maximize the absolute number of business units in the economy,
despite whatever welfare losses might be imposed by foregone economies of
scale.2
While a credible development of Brandeis' views, McCraw's analysis
1. Much ofMcCraw's analysis relies on the distinction between center firms and peripheral
firms and the theory of the dual economy. See generally R. AVERITT, THE DUAL ECONOMY:
THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1968).
2. McCraw, of course, is not the first to suggest that some of the goals of the Sherman Act
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bears little relation to current antitrust law. Not only is there little support
for the conclusion that more pivotal reformers such as Senator Sherman
based their beliefs on political rather than economic concems,3 but congressional inaction has long since placed an imprimatur of approval on the economic approach.4 Moreover, especially with respect to a statute as facially
obscure as the Sherman Act, speculations regarding the motives of its authors can hardly be conclusive. Indeed, Mccraw if anything seems reluctant to exalt the political over the efficiency rationale for trade regulation,
as evidenced in his discussion of Brandeis' support for exempting small
businesses from price-fixing prohibitions (pp. 49-50). Nevertheless, McCraw asserts that the American experience with antitrust regulation evidences "a powerful disinclination to persist in hard economic analysis that
may lead away from strong ideological preferences" (pp. 54-55). Perhaps,
but contemporary antitrust policy is the domain of technocrats, not reformers. The closest thing to ideology in the regulation of industrial concentration is almost surely the wealth-maximization of Posner and his disciples. 5
Ifso, the implicit distinction between political (or intellectual) ideology and
economic analysis may be limited to an historical observation.
Another theme uniting the various contributions to Regulation in Perspective is America's historical ambivalence between corporate power on
the one hand and governmental power on the other. While scarcely an
original insight,6 this ideal leads to some interesting commentary by Morton Keller. Keller convincingly suggests that this ambivalence has fostered
a highly complex regulatory system, one which reconciles one of the world's
most extensive regulatory networks with one of its freest economies, and
one of the strictest antitrust policies with one of the highest levels of merger
activity.
Generalizing from history, the authors also look to recent changes in
American regulation. These changes, suggests David Vogel, include shifting ideologies, heightened concern for social issues, and more intense political debate about the intrusiveness of federal regulation and its costs to the
private sector. But Vogel also points out the rise of administrative agencies
as independent sources of public policy, illustrating his assertions with examples drawn from recent environmental and consumer-protection
legislation.
were inconsistent with consumer welfare maximization. See generally Bork, Legislative Intent
and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966).
3. See Weaver,Antitrust Division ofthe Department ofJustice, in THE POLITICS OF REOU•
LATION 130 (J. Wilson ed. 1980).
4. At least since United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), ajfd. per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), the courts have viewed the antitrust laws primarily
as guardians of economic efficiency. The congressional failure to repudiate the economic approach arguably constitutes approval of the statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1841 (1982); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 580-81 (1978).
5. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976). Posner has since ranged far from industrial
market structure in developing his ethical system of ''wealth maximization." See, e.g., R. PosNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
6. See E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN EcoNOMIC AMBIVALENCE 472-73 (1966).
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The authors' greatest contribution is locating regulation in its historical
context. Too often, regulation is described as an autonomous phenomenon,
not a human institution. Instead, as the authors make clear in the several
contexts they have chosen and in the themes they sound in common, public
ideology gave rise to regulation and in large part explains its current forms.
As James Q. Wilson has remarked concerning the development of regulation, "we must be struck at every tum by the importance of ideas."7 It
follows that those who would understand - or influence - the future of
regulation must attend to the public attitudes that have called forth the administrative arm of modem govemment. 8

7. Wilson, The Politics ofRegulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 393 (J. Wilson ed.

1980).
8. Regulation in Perspective is also reviewed by Ritchie, Book Review, 56 Bus. HIST. Rev.

87 (1982).

